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Abstract
Malicious code detection is a critical part of any cyber security operation. Typically, the behavior of normal
applications is modeled so that deviations from normal behavior can be identified. There are multiple
approach to modeling good behavior but the most common approach is to observe applications’ system call
activity. System calls are messages passed between user space applications and their underlying operating
systems. The detection of irregular system call activity signals the presence of malicious software behavior.
This method of malware-detection has been used successfully for almost two decades. Unfortunately, it can be
difficult to cover this concept at the right level of detail for undergraduate information systems students. Some
instructors provide only superfluous descriptions of malware, others delve into in-depth reviews of
application code. This paper advocates an approach which teaches the fundamentals of code analysis to non-
programmers. The approaches integrates visualization tools such as flame graphs to help students interpret
software behavior. It has been found to be especially valuable for upper division information systems courses
on cyber security.
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INTRODUCTION 
A core function of cyber security is detecting malicious activity against host 
computer systems. Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems model the expected 
behavior of user-space applications (Hofmeyr, Forrest, & Somayaji, 1998). They 
observe events generated by the applications and note their impact on the operating 
system. Once a model is established, it is used to analyze subsequent activity and 
identify behavior which does not follow expected patterns (Bau & Mitchell, 2011). 
The assumption is that anomalous behavior represents a threat to host security. The 
main advantage of this approach is the ability to detect previously-unknown attacks.  
Models of system behavior typically focus on system call activity (Warrender, 
Forrest, & Pearlmutter, 1999). A system call is request sent from a user-space 
application to an operating system (Figure 1). Applications are not allowed to 
perform restricted tasks or interact with hardware directly.  Instead, they must ask 
the operating system to perform these tasks on their behalf. These communication 
sequences provide a ready channel for observing software behavior (Kuhn, 
Wallace, & Gallo, 2004). Applications issue the same sequences of system calls in 
order to execute the same basic processes. For instance, the same set of functions 
must be used in order to write to network. This allows for prediction of future 
behavior. System call analysis is a popular method for behavioral modeling because 
it is relatively low-cost in terms of performance, relatively accurate, and 
unobtrusive (Bowring, Rehg, & Harrold, 2004). Much of the information which is 
required can be gathered using built-in stack trace utilities.  
 
Figure 1: System Calls Within the Modern Operating System 
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Although the software for detecting host intrusion is highly reliable, it remains 
important for information systems professionals to understand the detection process 
(Mahoney & Chan, 2003). These individuals are expected to ensure system security 
and create comprehensive security strategies. They are also expected to make 
informed purchase and implementation decisions(Allen, Christie, Fithen, McHugh, 
& Pickel, 2000). Furthermore, intrusion detection systems occasionally misclassify 
application behavior (Engler, Chelf, Chou, & Hallem, 2000). It is occasionally 
necessary for IS professionals to overrule classification decisions so that valid 
software is allowed to remain while malicious code is removed(Kang, Fuller, & 
Honavar, 2005). Therefore, it is not only helpful, but in some cases essential that 
the information systems professional have a working knowledge of the system call 
process and the operation of host intrusion detection systems (von Solms & 
Niekerk, 2013).  
Despite the importance of this skillset, relative few IS professionals are given 
adequate training. Intrusion detection has become highly automated and the levels 
of false positives has dropped significantly over the past two decades (Allen et al., 
2000). The ability to statistically detect suspicious software has been taken for 
granted. Undergraduate information systems student tend to either receive cursory 
training or are required to take a full-length course which requires advanced 
programming skills (Bishop, 2003; von Solms & Niekerk, 2013). However, neither 
of these options are ideal. The former provides too little substance while the latter 
requires skills which IS majors may not possess (Cone, Irvine, Thompson, & 
Nguyen, 2007). Therefore, this manuscript proposes training which is appropriate 
for IS majors wishing to focus on cyber security. The training is called static system 
call analysis. It integrates a visualization tool called a flame graph (Gregg, 2014). 
Flame graphs show the most used code-paths through series of system calls. The 
hallmarks of modified software - changes in system call frequencies and changes 
in code paths are easily discerned through a comparison of computer-generated 
graphs (Mancuso, 2012). The graphs can be printed and included in lecture slides. 
The purpose is to provide a basis for learning how intrusion detection systems work. 
From this starting point, students will be able to branch out and learn how other 
types of intrusion detection systems operate. 
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The proposed method for static analysis of software behavior is useful for 
understanding the principles of intrusion detection. It assumes an understanding of 
system and software operations but does not require extended code walkthroughs. 
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: the following section 
provides the background. It reviews related research and methods for teach 
malware detection concepts in undergraduate courses. After contextual information 
is provided, the proposed static analytical method is introduced. This section 
describes flame graphs and the proposed method of static analysis. Finally, the 
paper is summarized and implications are suggested. 
BACKGROUND  
Certain subject areas, especially in computing-based fields, lend themselves to 
visual representations (Cimons, 2012). Diagrams, graphs, and figures have 
traditionally been used in topics from computer science and information systems 
curricula (object-oriented programming, entity-relationship diagrams, Unified 
Modeling Language, etc.). Attempting to teach even basic programming or 
architecture concepts without the use of visual aids would be unnecessarily difficult 
for both the instructor and the students. Because of their prior exposure and reliance 
on visual tools for learning, students in computing-based fields are well-suited to 
understanding concepts through the use of visual materials (Eppler, 2006). 
Visualization has a rich history in computer science and other related fields 
(Baecker, 1998), but has been curiously lacking in computing classes based on 
cybersecurity principles. 
Designing lessons with visual materials is especially relevant for computing 
concepts that are unfamiliar, abstract, or inherently difficult to understand. Students 
who major in a computing-based field can often choose a program focus from a 
variety of concentration areas; therefore, not all computing majors are focused 
primarily on programming or software engineering. For students outside of these 
focus areas, learning about basic information security topics, such as malware or 
intrusion detection, can be difficult when text-based examples are the primary 
teaching tools. Intrusion detection in particular, which is commonly demonstrated 
through the analysis of a Linux stack trace, is a topic students struggle to understand 
conceptually using traditional teaching methods. 
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PROPOSED METHOD  
Overview 
In response to a need to teach the essentials of malware detection to non-
programmers, this section describes method of static analysis of function calls. The 
purpose is to identity normal software activity and then detect anomalous behavior. 
The proposed method centers on the use of visual aides to interpret low-level 
system activity and identify anomalies. Prior to introducing the method in class, the 
instructor should first conduct a primer on modern operating systems and malware. 
Next, the instructor should outline the various types of intrusion detection systems. 
Once this context is provided, the method should be introduced. 
To begin, a stack trace of a user-layer application should be collected and 
displayed. The concept of system calls should be introduced if it have not already 
been described. The stack trace should then be piped through an algorithm which 
produces flame graphs. The instructor should describe how to interpret flame 
graphs and note any emerging patterns. Next, the stack trace from a corrupted or 
compromised version of the same software should be procured. After the 
corresponding flame graph is drafted, the two visualizations should be compared. 
A tool called flamegraphdiff may be used to assist in the comparison (Bezemer, 
2014). This software provides a graphic depiction of the differences between any 
two graphs and gives precise differences in frequency statistics.  
After presenting the two graphs, the instructor should draw implications from 
key differences in frequency and code path. The session should end with a 
discussion of the risks of false positives and negatives. For homework, students, 
should be given several flame graphs of the same software. One graph should be 
marked trusted with the others are unmarked. The students should be expected to 
analyze the outputs and identify suspicious behavior. Alternatively, students could 
be asked to create two flame graphs on their own – one for a trustworthy version of 
any application and another for a compromised or altered version of the same 
application. 
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Flame Graphs 
The concept of the flame graph was born out of a need to detect and analyze 
CPU performance problems (Gregg, 2016). A common technique for analyzing 
system performance is sampling stack traces. Tools such as Linux perf_events and 
DTrace may be used to collect the stack trace data (McDougall, Mauro, & Gregg, 
2006). The traces typically depict each function as a separate line and in reverse-
calling order (e.g., child-to-parent). This provides a very comprehensive view of 
system operations. However, it can also be overwhelming (see Figure 2) (Fattori, 
Paleari, Martignori, & Monga, 2010). A few seconds of collection will result in tens 
of thousands of stacks and hundreds of thousands of lines of output. The data must 
be condensed in order to be of utility to analysts. There are various methods of 
achieving this. For instance, data can be condensed into a tree structure with counts 
or percentages for each code-path branch. Alternatively, the trace could be sampled 
at finite intervals. However, even the condensed output may be difficult to interpret. 
The flame graph was developed to overcome this type of problem.  
 
Figure 2: Raw Output From Linux Stack Trace 
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Flame graphs uses stack traces as inputs and create a visualization of common 
stack trace paths and their frequencies. Each stack trace is represented as a column 
of boxes, where each box represents a function. The stack depth is shown on the Y-
axis while the X-axis spans the stack trace collection. The boxes on the top of the 
graph are the child functions while the boxes below are parent functions. Thus, a 
top-to-bottom review shows the ancestry for each stack. The width of each box is 
an indication of the frequency of the associated function. Larger boxes represent 
more common called functions within the stack trace. Although flame graphs depict 
boxes as different colors, the actual color selection is not significant. Finally, each 
box is labeled with the name (or abbreviation of the associated function). A sample 
is depicted below (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Example Flame Graph 
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Static Stack Analysis 
The procedure for comparing flame graphs and detecting anomalies relies on 
controlled data collection. Less noise in the stack trace allows for more accurate 
analysis. To alleviate confusion, sampling should be limited to only those functions 
associated with one application. This can easily be done with most performance 
monitoring utilities. Further, the length of sampling time should also be controlled. 
This ensures that only the behaviors of interest are observed. It should be expected 
that changes, patches, or software updates will change the behavior of any given 
application. Each time a program is updated recalibration is necessary. 
It is important to distinguish between stochastic and deterministic periods of 
software activity. Stochastic behavior varies according to time. It is not predictable. 
For instance, user interaction with software is a stochastic process because the 
user’s input changes software behavior. Two periods of interaction with the same 
program could lead to vastly different flamegraphs. Therefore, it is important to 
sample the stack trace during periods of deterministic or predictable activity. For 
instance, application boot up is typically deterministic. The same procedure for 
initialization is followed on every load request. This predictability allows for 
behavioral patterning. As long as an application is not modified the stack traces of 
multiple load-ups should be similar.  
Assuming that two or more controlled collections of stack data, it is possible to 
detect anomalous application behavior.  At least one of the flame graphs should 
represent activity which was observed at a trust point in the application’s lifecycle. 
This visualization represents a baseline of normal activity. Ideally, multiple 
collections should be taken in order to ensure that the behavior under observation 
repeats under the same conditions. It should be noted that due to noise and other 
uncontrollable variables, flame graphs may vary slightly even for static processes. 
For instance, Figure 4 (below) shows a comparison of flame graphs for an 
immutable application. Even though the software has not been modified or in any 
way corrupted, the resulting graphs differ slightly. A closer inspection reveals that 
no existing stacks were removed and no new call stacks were introduced in the 
application on restart. Thus, the real baseline is thought to approximate an average 
of the visualizations. 
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Figure 4: Analysis of Normal Behavior 
Once a baseline is established, follow-up application behavior can be statically 
analyzed. The charts can be compared manually or using a compare_diff function 
to isolate differences. The main indications of abnormal activity include changes in 
call stack composition (such as the introduction of new functions within a stack), 
introduction of new stacks, removal of existing stacks, or changes in stack 
frequency. These changes represents a deviation in software behavior. Most have 
benign causes (e.g. system library is updated). However, some are indicative of 
deviant behavior. For instance, Figure 5 (below) depicts several modifications to 
the boot process of a common database management system. Several new stacks 
have been injected into the boot process. These stacks initiate a database query and 
then write several packets worth of content to the network. This is an example of 
subtle data exfiltration: each time the database is loaded, admin login credentials 
are sent to a fixed IP address. The key indications that this is suspicious behavior 
include the query of the mysql_users table and the addition of network write 
functions within a process in which none are normally made. 
 
Figure 5: Detection of Anomalous Behavior 
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CONCLUSION 
It should be assumed that IS professionals, especially those employed in a cyber 
security capacity, will need to understand the interworking of anti-malware 
programs. At some point in their careers, they will likely be expected to make anti-
malware acquisition and implementation decisions, manually detect suspicious 
activity, and occasionally overrule automated detection systems. Thus, this 
manuscript proposes a method for teaching static system call analysis to detect 
malicious behavior. The proposed method of static call stack analysis has been used 
for two semesters to teach the concept of host based intrusion detection to 
undergraduate information systems majors. Over this period of time, a pool of 
flame graph sets has been developed. Each set focuses on a specific application and 
includes at least one baseline image. The pool is made available online to the 
students enrolled in the course. Unfortunately, there is not yet enough data to 
support statistical analysis from past semesters. However, future will empirically 
explore the efficacy of the proposed approach against existing methods. For those 
wishing to explore this method, some best practices herein conveyed: 
 Don’t assume that learners are familiar with system calls; provide a succinct 
primer 
 Students should be coached into focusing on the degree of difference between 
graphs, not binary classification of behavior (e.g. benign or malicious) 
 Encourage interpretation of  call stacks as behaviors rather than a series of 
isolated functions 
 Focus on qualitative differences rather than quantitative differences between 
graphs 
The static method of system call analysis provides information systems 
undergraduates with an opportunity to identify anomalous activity. Beyond this 
outcome, it also facilitates a deeper understanding of the host-based intrusion 
detection decision making process. Even though IDS differ according to their 
decision making criteria, they tend to focus on the same basic behavioral traits. This 
lab is useful because it cuts through several layers of technical details and allows 
non-programmers to understand application behavior. Future research will compare 
learner performance using traditional teaching approaches versus the proposed 
methods in order to empirically assess the artifact. It is expected that the results will 
confirm the efficacy of the static analytical method for detecting malware. 
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